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Abstract 
 
In developing countries markets for agri-food products are changing at a pace that is 
unparalleled in modern history. Markets are increasingly open and increasingly 
homogenized toward international tastes and requirements for levels of quality, packaging, 
safety, and even process attributes such as socially or environmentally friendly methods. 
New distribution channels, dominated by larger firms including supermarket retailers, are 
imposing high performance demands on their value chains. In order to respond to these 
increasing market demands, developing countries are facing an inexorable shift toward more 
industrialized models of farming systems. This shift represents new challenges for small and 
medium farmers’ access to markets and their ability to compete, as traditional standards are 
often no longer adequate even in some of the more lucrative national or internal markets. 
The key for many is to understand and achieve new levels of standards. 
The question for many countries—and not just developing countries—is what options are 
there for small farmers, which still comprise the great majority of the world's agricultural 
producers? Policy solutions will require a commitment to innovative institutional structures 
that can equitably link international capacity to local needs. A better understanding and 
collaboration with value chains via practical structures such as contract farming will help to 
ensure competitiveness and inclusion of small and medium-sized enterprises and smaller 
farmers. 
JEL Classification: F12, Q12, D02, Q27 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In developing countries, the markets for agrifood products are changing at a pace that is 
unparalleled in modern history, becoming increasingly open and homogenized toward 
international standards. New distribution channels, dominated by larger firms, are imposing 
higher performance demands, including social and environmental standards, throughout the 
value chains. Traditional ways of doing business are often no longer adequate, resulting in 
new challenges for small and medium farms. Acquiring the technical know-how and financial 
resources to incorporate standards such as quality assurance, safety, and traceability is 
difficult and failure to do so marginalizes many small and medium farms and agro-
enterprises. 
The public institutions that could traditionally provide such support to farmers have steadily 
eroded and are now often non-existent. Until the late 1980s, rural development was typically 
state-focused, with public institutions controlling the systems and infrastructure for agri-
market inputs and outputs. These institutions were, for the most part, unceremoniously 
scrapped as their shortcomings became evident, free-market theories became prominent, 
and structural adjustment took hold. Their role in supporting smaller, more marginalized or 
remote producers, however, was important in facilitating equitable access to information and 
markets. Consequently, their absence in poorer regions has exacerbated market failures and 
left a vacuum that is not often adequately filled by the private sector. 
Through the lenses of value chain theory and institutional economics, we are beginning to 
better understand the interrelationship of private sector agricultural production and trade with 
the emerging processes of civil governance. From such understanding can emerge the 
necessary innovation and support required to provide sustainable solutions to the challenges 
of necessary capacity building or long-term financing required by smaller farmers and rural 
entrepreneurs who want to participate in the value chain. Without effective public and civic 
institutions, the ability of smaller farms and enterprises to participate is reduced. 
II. NEW DEVELOPMENTS AFFECT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS' MARKET 
ACCESS  
Due to improved logistics, faster communication, and fewer trade barriers, markets are 
increasingly open as well as increasingly homogenized toward international standards. 
Large farming systems are incorporating greater skills and more investment in technology 
and infrastructure to enable more controlled and large-scale production that is difficult for 
smaller farmers to achieve. The new market access challenges faced by smaller farmers do 
not apply just to exports since national or internal markets are beginning to imitate 
international standards, as part of a shift in the structure of distribution channels away from 
small local markets toward, for example, supermarkets. 
Supermarkets typically procure steady supply and large volumes of products from suppliers. 
For small farms, to enter into a supermarket’s procurement system may require heavy 
capital and technological investment as well as a more skilled labor force. Agricultural 
standards play an important role in these procurement systems. Often, farmers simply 
cannot meet these standards on their own (Reardon and Berdegué 2002ab). Arrangements 
such as contract farming are one way to resolve the uneven relationships between many 
small suppliers and a few large buyers. 
Agricultural standards evolved over the course of many years and were in essence codified 
publicly by regular accepted use, but the last decade or so has seen dramatic changes. New 
and often private standards are demanded by buyers in order to meet their value chain 
management needs or to reduce their exposure to risk.  
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How standards drive developments in the global agrifood system is intimately linked with 
functions of governance within the value chain; that is, conditions for participation in the 
chain are set, implemented, monitored, and enforced. In the past, these rules mainly dealt 
with meeting basic cost parameters and guaranteeing supply. However, as outlined by 
Giovannucci and Reardon (2000), standards have now become tools for product 
differentiation, playing new roles as strategic tools that are used for market penetration, 
safety assurance, traceability, quality control, incorporation of social and environmental 
guidelines, and even the definition of product niches.  
Smallholders in the supply chain often lack the internal capacity and the economies of scale 
to establish effective quality assurance and traceability systems. Small enterprises and 
producers, especially sectors that are export-dependent, may be marginalized unless they 
can make standard compliance cost effective and guarantee traceability for the buyers.  
Global Developments Driving New Trade Processes 
Today, because there is great exposure and public risks when standards fail to maintain 
food safety or when they permit social and environmental harm, they are driving a number of 
new processes such as Hazard Analysis at Critical Control Points (HACCP) and 
sustainability standards such as organics. The globalization of these value chains and the 
enormous volumes and concentrations of buying power can mean dramatic consequences 
for thousands or even millions of people. Recent scares, like mad cow disease, avian flu, or 
E. coli, have demonstrated how the failure of standards can cripple an entire subsector, even 
across developed nations such as the US and UK. As a result, not only firms but also 
governments and consumers are increasingly concerned. 
This concern is being progressively translated as higher requirements for market entry, 
including food safety, traceability, higher quality, and even certifications of process, i.e., 
HACCP, ethical, Fair Trade, organic, etc. These requirements are being driven by changes 
in three major areas: 
1. A new consumer environment  
Characterized by a predominant interest in personal health and increasing doubt in the 
ability of government to ensure food safety, this includes broader concerns such as 
unchecked chemical use in livestock that has led to antibiotic resistance in humans. 1 
Increased transparency and communications has led to more information and greater 
concern about the social and environmental conditions in the place of origin.  
2. A new business environment 
In the agrifood business, an increasing concentration of suppliers, intermediaries, and 
retailers stimulates new methods of differentiation and spur a more intense drive for new 
supply sources and greater efficiencies in costs and logistics. As global corporations face 
new risks, they adopt various risk management techniques, especially the demand for more 
standards. Fulponi (2005) notes that setting standards above minimum levels and requiring 
third-party certification and traceability are a corporate response to the risk of civil or criminal 
responsibility. These risks are not only based on food safety but also concerns for labor 
violations such as those reported in some cacao production regions, worker safety in flower 
                                                
1 One of the world’s most prominent medical associations warned of the dire human health consequences of the 
increasing resistance to antibiotics in the US where only 12 percent of all antibiotics are used for humans and 
the remaining 88 percent are routinely fed in intensive livestock operations (New England Journal of Medicine, 
1999). That journal has also noted that a likely result is that antibiotic-resistant infections had increased 800 
percent between 1992 and 1997. Some countries have banned the routine prophylactic use on livestock, and 
Denmark, for example, saw its antibiotic resistance drop from 82 percent to 12 percent (Robbins, 2003). 
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industries and fish packing plants, and below-subsistence wages in the coffee industry. In 
recent years, a record number of leading global companies voluntarily reported on social and 
environmental issues within their firms (Global Corporate Responsibility Reporting Trends 
2006). Many used independent audits to help ensure their transparency and credibility. 
3. A new regulatory environment 
As more and more food is traded globally, all governments struggle to monitor and manage 
the safety of their food supplies, typically by imposing new barriers to entry in the form of 
public standards, including import bans to manage a variety of livestock diseases or stiffer 
border inspections for contamination and phytosanitary violations. In some cases, 
governments resort to regulations such as the US bioterrorism laws and the EU's Maximum 
Residue Levels or GMO restrictions. 
These three environments have combined to stimulate the evolution of numerous standards. 
As public standards have multiplied, so have those mandated by private industry. Since 
1995, more private international food-related standards have emerged than in the previous 
five decades combined. Clearly, standards have become an important competitive factor and 
are becoming an important determinant of access to markets.  
Standards Increasingly Set the Rules of the Game 
Standards offer quality and safety assurance as well as differentiate and define product 
categories. In addition to food safety, taste, cosmetic quality, and nutritional value, they 
increasingly involve process requirements such as environmental impact, worker health and 
safety, animal welfare, and fairness to primary producers. In some cases, suppliers are 
required to provide reasonable assurance of social and environmental benefits that range 
from an International Organization for Standardization (ISO) series to HACCP to Organics. 
Such requirements can either facilitate market penetration or act as barriers to entry. 
Accordingly, standards are the new rules and they are evolving dynamically. Indeed, a 
common argument for private standards is that firms believe they can more quickly respond 
to market needs by controlling their own standards. Understanding and meeting them is 
becoming increasingly challenging. 
As incomes grow, so does the tendency to consume perishable foods such as meat, dairy, 
and aquatic products that are more susceptible to conveying life-threatening diseases. This 
tendency may be fueled by greater communication and trade influencing consumption 
patterns to resemble those of US and European consumers, whose tastes have been toward 
greater consumption of meat and dairy products where food safety standards are critical. 
Concomitantly, governments have become more sensitive to agriculture safety as scares 
ranging from BSE to avian flu impact human health and wreak economic havoc in some 
regions.2 
These shifts mean more pressure on producers and processors to comply, and many 
enterprises are simply not prepared. In the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—where the 
majority of processors are small and medium enterprises (SME)—the total number of 
processors has shrunk by two-thirds in the past decade as food processing has shifted from 
traditional, lower-risk products to meat, dairy, and aquatic products and horticultural produce 
that require higher standards and greater investments (see Figure 1).  
                                                
2 For example, outbreaks of avian influenza in Southeast Asia during 2004 and 2005 halted the production and 
trade in poultry products, affected suppliers of feed and other inputs, severely reduced tourism, and seriously 
affected other parts of the economy, not least of all the deaths of some 204 people up to November 2007. 
Estimates of the economic loss are around 1.5 percent of the GDP for some of those affected countries. 
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Figure 1: Output Structure in Chinese Food-processing Industries,  
Percentage of Total 1998–2003 
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Source: Adapted from data of Chinese Food Industries Year Book, 1999–2004 in Lu (2005). 
A report released by Rabobank predicts that the PRC will become the world's third-largest 
fresh produce exporter within three years.3 Despite ongoing difficulties with meeting some 
standards in advanced markets, the PRC is forging ahead with high-value exports and has 
invested in standards and control systems to manage this output. It already produces half of 
the world's fruit and vegetables, mostly for domestic consumption, and exports of these 
products reached US$7.2 billion in 2006. According to FAOSTAT, this represents a 
substantial 7% of global trade in fruit and vegetables and trails only the Netherlands, the US, 
and Spain.4  
Experience from other regions already points to some difficulties. Jaffee and Henson (2004) 
note that the rejection of agricultural imports due to not meeting standards cost low- and 
middle-income countries about US$1.6 billion in 2000–2001. In 2002, the PRC, Thailand, 
Turkey, Brazil, and Viet Nam accounted for nearly 60% of the EU's rejections from non-EU 
sources (Jaffee and Henson, 2004). USDA and FDA statistics note a rising trend in such 
food safety problems, with reports almost doubling from 1994 to 2004 (Center for Science in 
the Public Interest, 2007), and these US agencies plan to advocate preventive controls, 
including higher import safety standards. 
Governance  
Standards take different forms. They may be set in commercial legal codes and subject to 
fines if transgressed, they may be internationally recognized and widely used even though 
they have no specific legal basis, or they may be private, firm-specific requirements (see 
Table 1).  
Standards can be enforced by participants within the chain as well as by external agencies. 
From within the chain, the key sanction is excluding a supplier from participating. The 
converse of this is that well-performing suppliers can be favored with longer-term contracts 
and higher prices (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). Sanctions may also be exercised outside the 
chain, and many governments have extensive bureaucracies checking compliance with 
legislation and even prosecuting offenders. In recent years, NGOs have grown into an 
important sanctioning force. Boycotts and publicity campaigns, or the threat of them, have 
also forced many leading firms to change the way they produce or to delist particular 
suppliers (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001).  
                                                
3 Cited in “China inching up world exporter list.” Accessed September 2007: http://www.freshinfo.com/index. 
php?s=n&ss=nd&sid=40288&s_txt=Patrick+Vizzone+China&s_date=0&ms=7.5261569023132&offset= 
4 The Netherlands figure is skewed by considerable trans-shipments through its ports, and Spain’s is heavily 
dependent on a few citrus crops. 
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Table 1:  Characterizing Different Types of Standards 
Type of Codification Legal Codification Internationally Agreed  
Regionally 
Specific  
Firm 
Specific  
Type of 
standard  
Product  
 Food hygiene  
standards 
 
 Codex Alimentarius 
 Grades of wheat 
 Moisture level for 
coffee beans 
 EU MRLs 
 EU GMO limits 
Chiquita 
residue and 
size 
standards  
Process  
 Workplace 
health and safety 
standards   
 ISO9000 (quality)  
 SA8000 (labor) 
 Fair Trade 
 BRC 
 ASEAN-GAP   
Starbucks 
sourcing 
practices  
Source: Adapted with changes and additions from Kaplinsky and Morris (2001). 
What is common to value chains is the increasing concentration of power among a few 
actors, leading to increased horizontal and vertical coordination. The considerable 
purchasing power of large-scale retailers in particular, enables them to set private standards 
that are typically diverse, can be confusing, and are always more demanding than the public 
safety standards of most countries. Since standards can be influenced considerably by both 
public and private sectors, producers and processors of agricultural products have to serve 
many masters. 
The world’s largest grocery retail markets by value are now the USA, Japan, the PRC, India, 
and the UK, and by 2020 the PRC is expected to more than double its value and move into 
second place. All these markets share development characteristics defined by the nature of 
their distribution channels. Today's retail food industry increasingly resembles the definition 
of a classic oligopolistic industry. At the top are large multi-unit retailers that tend to 
dominate consumer food distribution in many countries. For example, in the US the top five 
supermarket chains accounted for over 40% of retail food sales in 2000, while in 1993 they 
accounted for 20%. In France during this same period, the top five chains increased market 
share from 48 to 61% while in Italy it more than doubled from 11 to 25% (Busch and Bain, 
2004).  
The largest are powerful multinationals and include US-based Wal-Mart with more than 
5,000 mostly hypermarket-type stores, France-based Carrefour with more than 11,000 
stores of varying formats, and Netherlands-based Royal Ahold with more than 5,000 
supermarkets. As reference, their annual revenue is greater than the total value of any 
country's agriculture sector. Wal-Mart revenues, for example, topped $300 billion, and its 
international sales exceeded $70 billion in 2006. Such dominant players are the major 
drivers behind a staggering global flow of commodities, products, information, and finance 
that coordinate the activities of hundreds of millions of farmers and affect billions of 
consumers.5  
                                                
5 As an example, in Europe while there are around 3.2 million farmers and 160 million consumers, there are in 
fact only 600 supermarket companies and 100 wholesale distributors supplying the majority of the markets 
(Grievink, 2003). While most of the major supermarket chains have their own integrated distributor systems, 
the smaller chains and independents rely on outsourcing their purchasing and distribution systems to 
independent wholesalers. In another example from Australia, three supermarkets (Woolworths, Coles, and 
Franklins) control nearly 80 of the grocery sales, and three wholesalers (Davids, Australian Independent 
Wholesalers, and Foodland Associated Limited) supply all retailers (COA, 1999). AIW, is a subsidiary of 
Woolworths. The concentration of buying power in a few companies means that it is very difficult for 
smallholder farmers from developing countries to gain access to such high-value markets. 
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Producers and SMEs Face Difficult Hurdles 
Developing country producers and SMEs face a number of hurdles to participate effectively 
in higher-value trade. An IFPRI article (Hazell, 2004) refers to the often-stated need for 
better infrastructure, linking to markets, and credit (among others) and notes that 
nonetheless, these still do not sufficiently address the problems of compliance with an 
increasingly complex standards environment. 
Project effectiveness reviews for the countries of the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific 
signatories of the Lomé Convention, looking at Quality & Conformity in the Fruit & 
Vegetables Subsectors, note that private standards present formidable technical barriers 
that have a negative effect on smallholders. Exporters select only the best-performing 
smallholders to be organized into groups, and these are expected to manage food safety 
and traceability systems. In addition to the high cost of certification, there is evidence that 
weaker farmers are often excluded. For example, one of Zambia’s largest horticulture 
exporters limits itself to source only one product from smallholder producers.6 The exporter 
fears that if the smallholder cooperative cannot meet the required standards, it may risk 
losing its Global-GAP certification.  
Institutional structures are necessary to achieve a form of vertical coordination that can 
overcome transactions costs and standards barriers that smallholders face. In the 
Philippines, as in other countries, the growing popularity of contract hog farming allows feed 
millers to use smallholders’ labor and land, and to fatten hogs at low cost. Such small-scale 
livestock operations have thrived in many regional markets. As that changes, and large-
scale industrial operations become ever more dominant, small enterprises without the 
support of institutional structures and organizations are less likely to survive. 
The Growth of New Distribution Channels 
Recent studies point to the shift in marketing channels available to producers and the rapid 
rise of supermarkets in developing countries (Reardon, 2005; Bingen and Busch, 2005; 
Fulponi, 2005; Reardon et al., 2003; Moustier et al., 2005). The 1990s saw the emergence of 
supermarkets as a major form of retailing in many developing countries (see Box 1), 
becoming dominant players in many Latin American countries with the trend moving rapidly 
in East and Southeast Asia and more slowly in South Asia (see Figure 2).  This development 
is substantially transforming the nature and the composition of domestic agrifood commerce 
as well as regional and overseas trade. 
Box 1: Supermarkets Emerge in US and Explode in Latin America and Asia
Developments around the supermarket concept are representative of trends experienced in other multi-store 
retail formats. The supermarket—self-serve, larger scale retailer often with more than one check-out counter—
emerged in the US about 75 years ago.  
 
Between 1925 and 1955 supermarkets captured more than half of US grocery sales. By the 1980s they had 
become the dominant food distribution channel in the US. Today Germany, the UK, and France show 
supermarket shares of food retail at 70-80%. This business model, now refined, has emerged much more 
quickly than that of either the EU or the US, with strong implications for domestic and regional food suppliers. 
 
                                                
6 The exporter only contracts for baby corn, a product that is less likely to result in pesticide residues. 
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Figure 2: Growth in Supermarkets on a Regional Basis, 1997–2002 
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It is important to understand the effects of this market transformation, not only on producers 
and value chains but also on the entire agrifood system, since it affects costs and 
distributional issues from the farm to the table. Within these larger trends, several important 
developments can be observed: 
• Increasing demands for higher levels of farmer performance in quality, process, and 
financial capacity to invest in technology and operating capital; 
• Greater centralization of retail procurement with the advent of the specialized, 
sophisticated multi-country logistics management wholesaler replacing traditional 
wholesalers;  
• Greater use of contracts and private systems to identify and reward preferred 
suppliers. 
The Asia region now represents barely a third of all of the global food retail sales. It is 
forecast to grow to 41% of the global food retail market by 2020 while Europe will comprise 
30% and the NAFTA area will shrink to 21% (IGD calculations). Multiple store retailers will 
be an important part of that as they are growing fast throughout the world, particularly with 
the liberalization of emerging markets and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). These include 
small-scale convenience stores, such as those associated with gasoline stations, 
supermarkets, and full-service retailers such as hypermarkets.  
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Developing countries are not exempt from the trend toward supermarkets. South America, 
parts of Europe, and advancing East Asian economies saw their supermarket share of food 
retail grow from about 10–20% in the early 1990s to more than 50% just a decade later 
(Reardon and Berdegue, 2002). The supermarket sector in Asia is now growing even faster 
than in Latin America (Reardon et al., 2003). The authors, citing A.C. Nielsen statistics, note 
that supermarkets in East Asian countries, such as those in the Republic of Korea; 
Taipei,China; and the Philippines, have achieved an average 63% share of the food retail in 
those countries (excluding the fresh segment, i.e., meat, fish, fruits, and vegetables). In 
Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, supermarkets have 
already captured an average 33% share of the non-fresh food retail. Applying the 
calculations of Reardon and others in Latin America, one can estimate that supermarkets’ 
share of the fresh segment in Asia is approximately half of their total share in packaged 
foods. 
In some countries the growth has been even more rapid. Indonesia’s supermarkets’ share of 
food retail was negligible before 1998 and by 2005 reached about 30% of the total 
(Natawidjaja et al., 2006). In the PRC, where supermarkets did not exist prior to 1990, they 
controlled 13% of total food sales by 2003, approximating the situation in Brazil and 
Argentina in the early 1990s but with one difference: the PRC is registering growth that is 
three times greater than Latin American growth rates in the 1990s. According to Hu et al. 
(2004), supermarkets in the PRC are growing faster than in any other nation at 30–40% per 
year. By 2002, supermarket sales in the PRC had already reached $55 billion, up from $10 
billion in 1996. Strong growth is likely to continue. IGD predicts that the entire Chinese 
grocery market will grow by 65% to US$456 billion between 2005 and 2010. 
The dominance of these new retail formats has resulted in the emergence of demanding 
new procurement channels and the decline of smaller informal markets that could more 
readily accept both small quantities and inconsistent qualities of foods from farmers and 
middlemen. In Viet Nam and the PRC, as supermarkets develop fast in cities, government 
policies favor centralization of food distribution and the reduction of street vending and 
informal markets (Moustier et al., 2005; Reardon, 2005).7  
The demands in the domestic markets of less developed nations are growing and are 
increasingly resembling those of export channels. Latin America, for example, is a primary 
exporter of fruits and vegetables, yet over the last 15 years supermarkets have grown to sell 
about 3 times more fruits and vegetables than are exported from the region. Reardon et al. 
(2005) and Vander Stichele et al. (2006) also claim that the increasing market domination by 
big corporations and multinational supermarket chains influences the prices producers 
receive and the conditions under which they must produce. The consolidation of 
procurement implies great challenges for smaller producers.8 
Supermarket channels have demanding private standards similar to export requirements for 
size, color, safety, consistency, volume, packaging, labels, etc., which implies the need for 
production level investments in drip irrigation, greenhouses, advanced storage, hygienic 
                                                
7  In Viet Nam, for example, the Domestic Trade Department of Hanoi views some street vendors as an 
undesirable influx of the rural and peri-urban poor coming into the city on a daily basis to sell products on the 
street, causing congestion, unsightliness, and a waste management problem. 
8 The increasing use of standards and contract systems in the global retailing industry has the potential to restrict 
access of smallholder producers to these higher-valued chains. In Bangladesh, as an example, Agora 
Supermarkets only had two branches in 2004. In order to obtain fresh produce they had contracting 
relationships with thousands of smallholder vegetable growers. They had planned to open two additional 
branches in 2005, and then to stop purchasing much of their food locally (within Bangladesh) and instead 
source everything from overseas. With four branches they believed they would then have enough volume of 
sales to enable them to order by the container load directly from Singapore (sourced from Australia, New 
Zealand, and the US). Ultimately, it was easier to deal with one freight forwarder in Singapore than thousands 
of farmers (Purcell and Hassanullah, 2004). 
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services, and logistics. These effects served to consolidate the many small suppliers to 
Thailand's largest supermarket chain, so that only the more professional operators—usually 
organized groups or larger farmers—could continue to trade with it directly (van Roekel et 
al., 2001).  
More investment and operating capital are also needed since the greater volume of export 
and supermarket channels often means lower margins and delayed payments from buyers. 
Meanwhile, the traditional middlemen and general wholesalers that provided the framework 
for moving products from farms to processors and retailers are morphing toward specialized 
procurers for larger retailers and chains. Consequently, spot and wholesale markets tend to 
decline in importance and forward contracts expand (Reardon et al., 2003). These contracts 
often involve requirements for much larger and more sophisticated harvest and storage 
operations, centralized distribution systems, and longer shipping distances that create an 
increasing need for clear standards.  
 III. OVERVIEW OF STANDARDS AND THEIR ROLE IN MARKET ACCESS 
Thousands of standards or standards-related agreements exist for the agrifood sector. While 
many are public with common applications, most of today’s agricultural trade standards are 
privately set by groups or firms and apply primarily to their specific needs. The complex 
distinctions between process and product characteristics and different types of indirect costs 
associated with standards can dramatically diminish their benefits and effectively make them 
barriers to entry (Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005). Standards affect not only producers but 
also value chains, agribusinesses, and consumers, so it is vital to understand who is forming 
standards, their motivations, their increasing privatization, and the impacts. 
Standards: Public and Private  
Public standards revolving around food safety, consumer protection, and trade facilitation 
are embodied primarily in government regulations and some international codes and 
accords. The public standards of individual governments are also important. Often they are 
the primary portal that products must pass through, and they can be both rigorous and 
mandatory. 
Private standards are those imposed by buyers and usually require higher levels of 
performance than the baseline public standards. These can apply to such areas as quality, 
process management, packaging requirements, or social concerns. While public standards 
are typically clear and well established, private standards can be more difficult, particularly 
because they can be fast-changing. Though sometimes called voluntary, private standards 
are becoming the basic de facto entry requirement for trade with many of the large-scale 
operators and leading value chains.  
Meeting private standards is becoming essential for doing business in higher-value 
agriculture. Among the best-known private standards are those of the International 
Standardization Organization (ISO) series, HACCP, Fair Trade, Organic, and Good 
Agricultural Practices (GAP) adopted by entities such as EUREP or ASEAN. Sometimes 
private sector standards like Certified Organic or HACCP are adopted and codified by 
government as regulations.  
In addition to the private standards noted above, individual firms are also developing their 
own internal norms that may differ from the current broader sectoral norms. Firms ranging 
from Cargill and Unilever to Cadbury, Starbucks, and Nestle all have undertaken such 
efforts. 
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Process standards are typically private in character and typically refer to the entire 
cultivation, packaging, or manufacturing process. These serve as criteria for sourcing 
decisions, and some pay closer attention to the responsible use of agrochemical inputs, 
energy, water, wastes, and the impact on communities and the environment. In addition to 
well-known process standards such as GAP, GMP, HACCP, and ISO, the cause-related 
standards are becoming increasingly popular. Some better-known examples are: 
1. Organic  
2. Fair Trade  
3. Ethical Trading Initiative  
4. Rainforest Alliance  
5. SA-8000  
6. UTZ Certified 
 
These are sometimes referred to as sustainability standards and are unique in that they can 
embody somewhat intangible social and environmental characteristics; see Error! 
Reference source not found.. Although all are managed by or originate from NGOs, these 
standards have evolved to become much more public in their objectives, transparency, and 
standard setting. All are nonprofit,9 and it can be argued that they fulfill a public good while 
filling a growing consumer demand. 
Organic  
Organic is the fastest-growing sector of the food industry, with global sales doubling since 
2001 and exceeding US$40 billion in 2007.10 High market growth rates are leading to supply 
shortages in some sectors such as fresh produce, meat, dairy, and certain processing 
ingredients. The Asia region alone has experienced triple-digit growth in organic farmland 
between 2000 and 2006. The International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements 
(IFOAM) is the global coordinating body for Organics. 
Organic standards are among the most misunderstood. They are sometimes considered to 
be simply the absence of synthetic inputs; however, this is only one aspect of an organic 
system. Organic agriculture relies on scientific and traditional knowledge to work with 
biological and mechanical methods to manage ecological systems. It works to optimize 
quality and sustainability while reducing external inputs and synthetic materials. 
Social issues such as labor rights and conditions are also part of organic principles but not 
commonly part of certification requirements. General environmental principles are clearly 
embedded in organic principles, but specific guidelines on aspects such as biodiversity are 
not necessarily part of the certification processes. Organic certification can also apply to 
processed food, and in this case most artificial preservatives or additives are avoided. 
For the purposes of most trade, organic products are third-party certified and include both 
internal controls and traceability. However, for local applications, different credence 
mechanisms are often utilized that do not depend on formal certification processes. These 
are often lower in cost and can be equally effective (Giovannucci, 2005). 
                                                
9  In some countries organic standards have become public standards by virtue of laws that regulate their 
application. 
10 Calculation based on historic growth data reported by IFOAM and Organic Monitor 
Table 2: Comparative Overview of Some Popular Process or Sustainability Standards 
Feature Organic Fair Trade Rainforest Alliance 
Premium Premium likely paid Premium assured Modest premium often 
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Eco-friendly or Safe Foods 
A broad range of standards exists that are focused primarily on ecological systems and the 
assurance of agricultural products produced in a manner that avoids toxic chemicals or other 
forms of contamination. Rainforest Alliance standards are among the best known of this 
category and are sourced in dozens of countries for sale primarily to the US, Europe, and 
Japan. Some nations have also developed standards. Japan has a government production 
standard that references ecologically friendly measures as well as food safety and requires 
certification by an accredited body. In the PRC  “Green Foods” are government-certified 
products are labeled under government supervision as safe from chemical contamination 
with their production and processing using more environmentally friendly processes. This 
standard is recognized only in the PRC, but some trading partners in Japan and Europe 
have accepted it as a substitute assurance for basic food safety measures. In 2003, green 
food exports topped US$1.5 billion. Other governments including Malaysia and Thailand 
have developed certifiable standards for agriculture. In India, less formal approaches include 
several traditional holistic farming systems based on ancient techniques for soil and animal 
management that eschew synthetic inputs and are in harmony with natural on-farm inputs 
and cycles. These are neither government regulated nor formally certified but are followed in 
many of the country’s regions and are commonly called either “Jaivic Krishi” or “Vedic 
Krishi.”  
especially if certified - but not 
assured 
paid but not assured 
Yield and 
quality 
Short-term impact on yields 
may be negative; possibly 
positive impact on some 
aspects of quality 
Only indirect (and 
possibly positive) impact 
of yields and quality due 
to higher income for 
inputs and labor 
Potentially negative 
yield impact; possibly 
positive impact on 
some aspects of 
quality 
Other income 
impacts 
Possibility of selling other 
organic products from the 
certified farm; income 
diversification 
Group collaboration 
facilitates economies of 
scale 
Possibility of selling 
forest as well as 
agricultural products 
Market access Access to well-established 
and reliable market 
Access to small but well-
established market 
Buyers and markets 
limited but increasing 
fast with major brands  
Extension, 
credit 
Possible extension from 
supportive NGOs but limited 
support from public system 
Improved access to trade 
financing and credit and 
improved financial 
position of cooperatives 
Possible agro-forestry 
extension from 
supportive NGOs, but 
limited support from 
public system 
Social impact 
and 
organizational 
capacity  
 
Potential increase in mutual 
support among farmers to 
solve farming management 
problems 
Increased organizational 
capacity of participating 
farmers; access to 
training; community 
projects 
Through social norms 
Environmental 
impact 
Improved soil fertility as well 
as resistance to drought and 
erosion; no synthetic 
agrochemicals  
Limited environmental 
benefits 
Improved biodiversity 
and agro-ecological 
conditions 
Risk, planning 
capabilities 
Risk reduction through 
reduced external inputs; no 
mono-cropping; soil 
resilience 
Cooperative level 
planning; guaranteed 
price reduces risk 
Integrated pest 
management  
Source: Adapted with modifications from Giovannucci and Ponte (2005). 
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Fair Trade 
Fair Trade is an alternative to the often asymmetrical buyer/producer negotiations featured in 
conventional trade and aims to improve the livelihoods and well-being of small producers by 
assuring a fair price agreement, continuity in trading relationships, and the strengthening of 
small-producer organizations. Fair Trade products are typically sold in more developed 
markets via an NGO-operated certification system. Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International (FLO) is the global coordinating body for certified products. Nearly 60 countries 
now export a variety of certified Fair Trade products and they are sold in more than 50 
countries. In 2006, the estimated retail value in these markets was more than €1.6 billion 
and products were sourced from two dozen developing countries.11 
Codex 
Codex Alimentarius is an intergovernmental body facilitated by the UN’s Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) that aims to 
protect consumer health and facilitate international trade in food. For decades its guidelines 
have been internationally recognized benchmarks for food products and form a basis for 
many standards, including national standards and those recommended by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). For example, it has evaluated hundreds of food additives and common 
contaminants and set maximum residue limits for approximately 2,500 combinations of 
commodities and pesticides. 
While certainly beneficial, particularly in setting baseline public standards and the 
development of many national regulations,12 Codex is a large, consensus-oriented organism 
and is therefore relatively slow to adapt to the needs of day-to-day trade and recommend 
timely changes.  
ISO  
The ISO is a network of national standards institutes from 157 countries and is organized as 
an NGO. Within its objective to facilitate international exchange of goods and services, it 
sets a number of the most popular trade standards and fosters standardization activities. Its 
standards are voluntary and typically codify sectoral best practices. Although ISO 
certification does not refer to the output of the process but only that a process is in place, it is 
perceived as a signal of conscientious management. 
An increasing number of ISO’s 15,000 standards and guidelines are relevant to producers 
and agrifood enterprises. The 9000 series, the most popular, promotes good management 
practices to ensure the consistent quality and delivery of goods and services. The 14000 
series promotes sound environmental management in order to minimize negative effect 
caused by various productive activities including agricultural processing. 
ISO is increasingly writing overview standards that capture trends in agrifood trade, such as 
ISO 22000, which is designed for generic food safety,13 and the forthcoming ISO 26000, 
which covers voluntary guidance on social responsibility and is slated for publication in 2010. 
ISO's importance extends to verification mechanisms in that many governments and private 
                                                
11 Based on FLO data, November 2007. 
12 Cambodia has adopted all of the Codex standards—at least on paper. Viet Nam had adopted about 60% of 
Codex standards relating to food and foodstuffs as of 2005 and planned to adopt all remaining ones (MOT and 
EU, 2005). 
13 ISO 22000 is an auditable standard and aligned with Codex’s HACCP but goes farther with requirements for 
food safety management systems and specific areas such as strengthening prerequisite programs and 
transforming the recommendations into requirements. ISO 22000 is coming into use, and the US Seafood 
Inspection Program (National Marine Fisheries Service) will soon start to audit for compliance with both ISO 
9001 and ISO 22000. 
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firms insist that certification bodies comply with a standard (ISO65) that is an international 
equivalent and recognized for other rulings such as European Norm EN 45011.14  
HACCP 
Hazard Analysis at Critical Control Points (HACCP) is a systematic analysis for potential 
food safety risks within, for example, a post-harvest or processing operation. The analysis 
typically identifies appropriate control and monitoring systems to minimize such risks. It 
assures that such a management approach has been established but not whether it is used 
or how effectively.  
 
It is most often used with higher-risk foods, such as poultry, livestock, and fish products. 
Typically, HACCP reduces food contamination risk in two ways:  
1. Anticipates potential problems or failures before they happen and does not depend 
only on a final   inspection;  
2. There is a greater likelihood of resolving the problem during process rather than at 
the end of the process or once the product moves into the supply chain or market. 
Consequently, HACCP can also yield cost savings in terms of reduced waste, reprocessing, 
or recalls.  
GAP and GMP 
The more recent ASEAN GAP standard is adapted to Asia-Pacific conditions and has many 
similarities to EUREP-GAP (known as Global-GAP as of September 2007). These standards 
are widely used by many companies, especially by firms that export to Europe. They are 
based on Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) that promote basic food safety principles to 
minimize biological, chemical, and physical hazards associated with crops from seed 
through harvest storage.15  
Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) begin from the harvest and storage stage and serve to 
guide the people working in contact with food, its packaging materials, and work environs to 
conform to basic sanitation and hygiene practices to protect against food contamination from 
both direct or indirect sources. These standards also typically improve worker safety. 
WTO Access and the Role of SPS and TBT Agreements  
The public or governmental application of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) or technical 
measures can act as standards and have a growing impact on the nature and direction of 
international trade controls. Although part of the WTO for some time, the SPS and Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreements are increasingly important ways to manage trade in light 
of the diminution of tariffs, quotas, and other formal measures. For example, Environmental 
and Related Health Requirements—provisions for which are contained in both the SPS and 
TBT agreements—have nearly doubled (rising from 10% to 18%) as a percentage of WTO 
notifications since the early 1990s (UNCTAD, 2006).  
SPS measures are intended to ensure human food safety and protect agricultural plant and 
animal populations and ecosystems. Each country sets food safety and animal and plant 
                                                
14 Similarly, ISO 61 is the recognized guideline for accreditation bodies and is often the benchmark for national 
rulings on this (e.g., The European EN 45010). ISO 62 covers quality system certifiers. 
15  They specifically address the following topics: site selection; adjacent land use; water; fertilizers; 
herbicides/pesticides; hygiene; field, facility, and worker hygiene; product cooling; and transportation.   
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health standards based on its own assessment of acceptable risk levels. The SPS 
agreement recognizes the right of countries to maintain national standards that are stricter 
than international levels, although they must be justified by scientific evidence and should be 
consistently applied. 
The TBT agreement aims to stop WTO members from using arbitrary technical regulations, 
standards, or testing and certification procedures to protect domestic producers. It applies to 
all aspects of food standards not covered by the SPS agreement, including labeling 
requirements, nutrition claims, and quality and packaging regulations, which are generally 
not considered as either sanitary or phytosanitary measures. TBT prevents members from 
distinguishing between goods on the basis of either production or processing methods but 
specifies conditions when members may restrict trade using technical regulations or 
standards. 
The WTO recognizes three organizations as sources of internationally agreed-upon 
benchmark agrifood standards that can affect SPS and TBT: the Codex Alimentarius, the 
Office International des Epizooties (known as OIE) for animal health, and the International 
Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) for plant health. The OIE is an 83-year-old 
intergovernmental organization that analyzes and disseminates veterinary information to 
provide expertise and transparency in control of global animal disease (includes aquatic). 
The IPPC is a standards treaty that aggregates 19 approved international standards, 
establishing measures to prevent the introduction and spread of plant pathogens and pests. 
Its Secretariat is within FAO, but it works through National and Regional Plant Protection 
Organizations such as the Asia and Pacific Plant Protection Commission or the European 
and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization to help countries meet their IPPC 
obligations.  
Harmonizing Standards 
Efforts have been made to develop more coherent meta-standards, particularly for food 
safety. Theoretically at least, they would permit the rapid movement of foods from country to 
country and facilitate the learning process of producers and processors when they are 
meeting only one general standard. Understandably, these efforts would raise issues of 
domestic impact in each country, particularly in poorer nations. The International Committee 
of Food Retail Chains (CIES) Global Food Safety Initiative is one harmonization effort to 
provide a single set of rules for standards. The International Social and Environmental 
Accreditation and Labeling (ISEAL) organization also strives to achieve harmonization 
among some of the most important eco-social standards bodies including IFOAM, Rainforest 
Alliance, FLO, UTZ Certified, and the Forest Stewardship Council. Their efforts can provide 
useful stepping stones for countries to collectively adopt standards guidelines and training 
frameworks that have broad-scale relevance and can reduce the individual cost of 
compliance. 
IV. THE CURRENT CAPACITY TO MEET EMERGING MARKET REQUIREMENTS  
The Challenge 
Standards are difficult for many developing-country farmers to achieve, yet they provide 
unique market opportunities. By meeting certain standards, farmers can reduce the risk of 
rejection in the marketplace as well as access new, more profitable market segments. Since 
standards set some producers apart, the differentiation they represent serves as a 
competitive tool. Clearly, SMEs and smaller farms in developing countries face challenges in 
meeting them. Many struggle to learn and apply these new expectations, and evidence is 
building that if they cannot achieve at least basic standards they risk being excluded from 
competitive markets both regionally and internationally with potentially serious 
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consequences for economic growth, poverty alleviation, and even food security (Vander 
Stichele et al., 2006; Moustier et al., 2005; Reardon et al., 2003). Most producers face 
common barriers when considering standards:  
1. Selecting which among the standards requires a good measure of market 
intelligence and contact with buyers as well as experience in assessing the relative 
demands, costs, and benefits of each—something  for which there is almost no data 
whatsoever; 
2. Few institutions exist to facilitate the adoption of standards as an ongoing learning 
process that takes both time and consistent training; 
3. Capital to invest in new processes, equipment, and infrastructure is difficult to 
access; 
4. Transaction costs for certifying products can be high and a barrier to entry; 
5. Risky learning is often done at an international level since local market demand is 
modest. 
Many processors, exporters, and retailers—especially for higher-value products—favor 
producers that can meet their demands for standards, large volumes, and year-round 
consistency. They sometimes create their own collection or purchasing systems that bypass 
local market networks thus reducing access. Typically this forces small- and medium-sized 
suppliers to either consolidate into organizations or larger firms or to compete for the lower-
value channels that remain. Three quick-sketch case studies point to the positive and 
negative experiences of different approaches; see Box 2, Box 3, Box 4. 
Box 2: Thailand Case Study
A value chain analysis was carried out on Tops Supermarket group, a dominant food retailer in 
Thailand. The study noted: 
• Variability of prices due to high losses from inadequate storage and refrigerated transport. 
• Slow order response time from poor production methods, planning, and information flow.  
• Inability to meet product specifications because of inadequate quality controls. 
• Coordination difficulties among small suppliers.  
• Lack of trust and cooperation among participants in the value chain. 
 
Tops Supermarket had a number of specific requirements for perishables that were not being met by 
its existing supply structure. When Tops insisted that its suppliers be certified under the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s new food safety program, most were unable to comply, and 190 of the 250 current 
suppliers were eliminated (Boselie, 2002). Most smallholders had difficulties meeting the conditions so 
only a few could continue and only by organizing as a group of second- or third-tier suppliers and 
subcontracting to the larger preferred suppliers that had the capacity and could afford the investments 
necessary to directly contract with World Fresh Distribution Center (van Roekel et al., 2001). 
 
This case demonstrates that competitive requirements served to eliminate smaller-scale participants. 
In this instance, public-private cooperation led to overcoming the problems for some of the more able 
participants. However, the lack of appropriate institutional structure and the explicit intent to integrate 
a broader group of suppliers effectively led to the exclusion of many.  
Box 3: People’s Republic of China Case Study 
Under different organizational models small producers have demonstrated a notable ability to meet 
very high quality standards and even achieve international certification. In the towns of the Feicheng 
area of the PRC's Shandong Province, local government committees have provided the institutional 
framework to organize large-scale value chains that feed processing companies in the region. Several 
companies are involved, and one of these, the Tai’an Asia Food Co., is a Sino-Japanese joint venture 
that receives the production of approximately 10,600 farmers. Farmers typically earn several hundred 
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US dollars annually, a remarkable sum considering that their average farm size is less than 0.1 ha.  
 
Feicheng specializes in high-value organic produce for overseas markets and is somewhat unique in 
that much of it is reclaimed land that was rendered toxic from excessive chemical use. The area 
produces 20 kinds of internationally certified horticulture crops with annual production volume of 
approximately 130,000 tons.   
 
With government acting as a catalyst, the processors, local input, transport, training enterprises, and 
farm communities have developed relations reminiscent of Porter’s cluster model.16 The interface 
between farmers and the large enterprises is often mediated by local government, which provides a 
tailored framework to support the farmers’ participation. It involves training, certification, extension 
services, and the facilitating of input distribution where necessary.  
 
The critical lessons derived here revolved around having access to sufficient and consistent training, 
especially during the conversion phase when many producers were unfamiliar with the new 
requirements. A steadfast, reliable institutional structure, e.g., local government, facilitated the 
producers' willingness to adopt new methods and substantially reduced their risk. Equally important 
was the presence of a dependable value chain that ensured access to lucrative markets. 
Source: Original case study conducted for Giovannucci (2005).  
Box 4: Indonesia Case Study 
For most Indonesian consumers, fresh fruit and vegetables (FFV) are taking on an increasing share of 
their total food expenses. This is especially true in urban areas where supermarket channels are 
capturing an increasingly greater share of the business, but much of the business does not involve 
Indonesian producers.  
 
Natawidjaja et al. (2006) found that nearly all retailers prefer to purchase imported FFV products 
rather than deal with Indonesian farmers due to inadequate value chains, missing or low-quality 
infrastructure, and poor standards. A striking 60% of the FFV sold by supermarkets are imported 
(approximately 80% of the fruit and 20% of the vegetables). This is considerably higher than the figure 
in other comparable developing countries. Larger retailers source directly from large-scale importers, 
while specialized wholesalers are making inroads by focusing on supplying the demanding needs of 
modern food industry channels such as fast-food chains and restaurants, institutional users, and 
supermarkets. 
 
In West Java, the most prolific FFV production area, farmers typically lack capital and self-
organization to produce according to requirements of supermarkets. Some specialized or dedicated 
wholesalers are increasingly working with small farmers but not more than 15% in any area. 
 
The notable lack of support services and institutional and physical infrastructure leads wholesalers 
and farmers to perceive the new FFV markets as a very difficult challenge met only by the most 
capitalized and capable. This makes most Indonesian FFV farmers essentially uncompetitive in their 
domestic consumer markets.  
Inadequate Standards and Forsaken Value 
Lu (2005) estimates that in 2004 alone the PRC experienced approximately $8 billion in 
reduced exports due to its failure to meet standards in numerous agricultural subsectors. 
This has happened in almost every sector, including grains, apiculture products, livestock, 
fungi, and fruits and vegetables. For example, the prohibition of Chinese animal products to 
the EU in 2002 caused a $623 million loss for 94 Chinese food-processing enterprises. In 
2002 and 2003, the PRC's export value of frozen spinach to Japan decreased by $372 
million compared to that of two years prior due to rejections for agrochemical residues. Even 
the US faced problems with standards when an E.coli outbreak leading to three deaths in 
                                                
16  Michael Porter’s cluster theory is useful for understanding the nature of complementary and sometimes 
competitive enterprises grouping in a region for mutual benefit. See, for example, Porter (1980). 
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mid-2006 resulted in expected losses for the US spinach industry17 reaching $100 million for 
the year.  
The recent discovery in Europe of illegal, genetically modified rice from the PRC prompted 
the European Commission to discuss far-reaching import restrictions that would affect 
numerous rice farmers. This would apply also to non-GMO farmers from affected areas, in 
effect burdening them for the standards compliance failure of their compatriots. It is not just 
the inability to meet food safety standards that diminishes potential income. Coffee 
producers in Cambodia and Laos, lacking technology and processing infrastructure, often 
cannot meet the basic quality requirements of international markets, and their production is 
now limited to domestic markets and some proximate cross-border trade.  
Similarly, Viet Nam’s prodigious coffee trade is second to rice as the largest agricultural 
export earner and directly employs 600,000 workers. Much of the production quality, 
however, is such that its exports have consistently earned less per pound FOB than any of 
the top ten producers between 1993 and 2003 (ICO statistics).  
The EU is Bangladesh’s most important client for its fourth-leading export: frozen shrimp and 
fish. In 1997 the EU banned Bangladeshi fishery products due to inspections that found 
serious infrastructure and hygiene deficiencies in processing establishments and insufficient 
quality control guarantees by government inspectors. Cato and Subasinge (2003) note that, 
in just five months that year, the revenues lost (US$15 million) nearly equaled the 
investment required to upgrade those plants and train personnel (US$18 million). The 
impact, both reputational and monetary, on the industry and economy of Bangladesh was 
substantial. 
Implications for Producers   
Currently, increased standards primarily impact those dealing with larger buyers or with the 
market for higher-value products. The developments in several countries noted previously 
indicate this will eventually be part of the equation for more buyers and for a broader range 
of products, even in secondary markets. Opportunities exist to better understand and adapt 
to new standards requirements in the secondary and regional markets in order to be better 
prepared for the eventual growing demands of those markets as well as to export 
competitively to the most lucrative markets.  
For producers to be competitive and have market access, they have to address eight 
development areas: 
1. Institutional structures – to deliver localized production training and farm and 
organizational management;  
2. Market intelligence – understanding what to produce, at what time, and according to 
what standards in order to meet buyer specifications; 
3. Quality – better inputs, particularly high-quality seed and appropriate varietals, for 
market-oriented production and capital investment for harvest and post-harvest 
requirements;  
4. Quantity – group organization for smaller producers to aggregate the necessary 
volumes; 
                                                
17 http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/10/26/spinach.fears.ap/index.html 
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5. Consistent supply – appropriate late- and early-season varietals as well as 
investment in greenhouse production;  
6. Trade transactions – sound contract law that is accessible with simple dispute 
resolution mechanisms; 
7. Certification – low-cost certification and efficient product testing services;  
8. Trade financing – contract farming and other internal value chain financing are 
important but will likely be insufficient. 
Enforcing standards without adequate incentives is difficult. IFAD research evaluating 
organics in Asia (Giovannucci, 2005) found that some aspects of standards may be 
bypassed where producers gain little benefit from compliance, especially where compliance 
is not easily checked at the farm gate. In the case of arabica coffee, Varangis et al. (2003) 
found that where farmer production was blended together by traders, thereby losing 
individual product identification, there was little or no reward for compliance or higher-quality 
and minimal penalty for non-compliance. Accordingly, the overall quality suffered as few 
farmers complied with the established standards. 
V. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE STANDARDS AND THE 
ROLE OF CONTRACTS  
Clearly, standards are a risk management tool, particularly for buyers that want to ensure the 
quality and safety of their supply. The demand for standards is being pushed increasingly 
upstream in value chains toward producers as a result both of government initiatives and 
private sector demands. When producers or processors can meet the required standards, 
they naturally improve their market access. In some cases producers may also enjoy other 
direct benefits and costs. 
Benefits: 
• Improvement in operational and managerial efficiency; 
• Greater participation in global supply chain and high-value products; 
• Environmental benefits of erosion reduction and soil improvement; 
• Health benefits; 
• Food security, including that of the rural poor (small farmers); 
• Economic benefit: price premiums. 
Costs: 
• Transition difficulties potentially affecting yields; 
• Investments in time and learning; 
• Financial investment for infrastructure and technology; 
• Higher operating costs for more complex processes. 
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Benefits: Direct and Indirect  
In some cases, implementing standards can improve operational and managerial efficiency. 
For example, the requirement to keep good records of farm inputs and their application can 
facilitate internal costs and benefits analysis and improve future planning. Giovannucci in 
Asia (2005) and Damiani in Latin America (2003) found that when small-scale traditional 
producers shifted to organic standards, they incurred additional costs but generally enjoyed 
long-term yield improvements and profitability due primarily to better farm management 
practices and price premiums. The results among intensive producers were mixed, with 
some resulting in net economic benefits and others resulting in few, if any, economic 
benefits (Giovannucci, 2005; Giovannucci, 2006). 
Some standards—particularly those that require independent certification—intrinsically fulfill 
many of the broader requirements for producers to participate in global supply chains or 
compete in high-value products. For example, detailed recordkeeping of production inputs, 
traceability, and third-party monitoring that are part of organics are also useful to improve 
chain competitiveness and more effectively participate in lucrative markets.  
Sustainability-oriented standards appear to have some additional benefits for farmers. For 
example, several recommend diversification away from dependence on a single cash crop, 
thereby reducing a producer’s risk of crop failure. Pretty et al. (2005) reviewed 286 
agricultural project interventions in 57 poor countries and noted that the application of 
improved environmental standards (IPM, organics, LEISA, 18  etc.) not only generally 
improved the supply of critical environmental services for the communities but also 
increased productivity on most of the 12.6 million farms covered. Several standards 
including GAP offer environmental benefits; studies have shown that these can reduce 
erosion and improve soil quality (FAO, 2002; Mader et al., 2002).  
Food security is of particular concern in areas of rural poverty. By fostering agricultural 
methods that improve not only the soil’s natural fertility but also its ability to withstand natural 
calamities such as drought (Altieri, 1999; Drinkwater, Wagoner, and Sarrantonio, 1998) and 
more efficiently use nutrients (Mäder et al., 2002), the likelihood of food shortages can be 
reduced. Setboonsarng (2006) notes several studies showing farmers that meet organic 
standards enjoy a number of advantages. For example, lower production costs can improve 
farm viability while diversification reduces the likelihood of catastrophic crop failure, and 
ecological management of local resources further contributes to local food security. 
Increasingly, sustainability concerns are emerging in many private standards such as 
Global-GAP and ISO. These may have some reference to the considerations of Organic, 
Fair Trade, or eco-friendly approaches while remaining simpler and less demanding. In most 
cases, meeting standards such as Organics means producers are able to meet the 
environmental requirements of many, though not necessarily all, other standards.. Bartram 
and Perkins (2003) reviewed 33 published studies and concluded that substantial 
biodiversity advantages existed when organic standards were applied. The field-to-table 
traceability, animal management requirements, and restrictions on the use of agrochemicals 
provide reasonable assurances of increased farmer safety, food safety, and animal health. 
The importance of farm-level diversification and a price premium for the required processes 
and certification further help to ensure a measure of economic benefit.  
Besides the clear economic value of market access, the evidence for direct economic 
returns resulting from the application of standards is less clear. In many cases, meeting a 
standard is not associated with a higher or premium price; it is simply a requirement for 
doing business in any high-value product. In commodities and lower-value products, the 
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failure to meet standards is likely to result in a lower price. This is the case for most GAP or 
GMP standards and all food safety standards. The research on the actual costs and benefits 
incurred in the adoption of standards is rather limited, although some attempts are currently 
being undertaken, the foremost being the Committee on Sustainability Assessment (COSA) 
measuring both direct and indirect costs and benefits of the major sustainability standards at 
not only the economic level, but the social and environmental levels as well.19 
It is hard to tell the extent to which a price premium is paid for achieving a standard or for 
meeting a quality level since many products also have some physical or organoleptic quality 
requirements and the reasons for payment are often not distinguished. In some cases a 
price premium is clearly associated with the achievement and maintenance of a particular 
certification; this happens most often with the more complex and demanding process 
standards related to sustainability such as Organic and Fair Trade.  
For products that are Fair Trade certified, typically a minimum price agreement exists that is 
considered a fair living wage for the producer. Organic product certifications can require 
considerable transition costs, recordkeeping, and traceability that elicit a price premium. 
Similarly, eco-friendly standards such as Rainforest Alliance’s are seen as an opportunity 
cost for producers electing to maintain biodiversity and environmental integrity; these too 
usually command a price premium. UTZ Certified currently commands a very modest 
premium though it is too early to tell if that will change for this fast-growing standard as it 
covers new crops beyond coffee. Ethical trade standards employed in several countries 
have resulted in improved market access but no clear indication of consistent market 
premiums. Conversely, when products fail to meet basic standards, they are likely to face a 
price penalty. 
Costs: Direct and Indirect  
Several types of costs typically are involved in the adoption of standards. First, a learning 
curve can require a large and prolonged time investment. This can also require sometimes 
costly institutional support from a producer organization, community, government agent, or 
NGO. Confusion about the types of standards and their specific requirements is an 
intangible cost. Little research has been conducted on these costs. Second, investment is 
sometimes required in equipment or infrastructure to meet standards. Third, the need for 
independent verification or certification for compliance and traceability also involves an 
expense. Traceability through the chain is increasingly relevant and challenging particularly 
in critical situations, e.g., positive residue tests, false or fraudulent declarations, or 
discrepancies in quantities traded. While direct certification costs are relatively simple to 
measure, it is difficult to categorize other typical costs of adopting standards since they 
depend heavily on two broad-ranging variables: the requirements of a specific standard and 
the producer’s or processor’s current ability to meet that standard.  
Adopting some standards involves a relatively modest change. In other cases, the transition 
can take years and a prolonged investment before costs are recouped. Without reliable 
market access, the often-higher operating costs of a new standard can be onerous.  
Standards are not necessarily exclusionary for small producers. Some that are oriented 
toward sustainability can sometimes provide an advantage for smaller producers. The 
typically more localized and labor-intensive aspect of organic standards mostly lend 
themselves better to smallholders. Fair Trade standards are designed specifically for small 
producers and laborers. 
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Standards can have unintended consequences—and considerable costs—for producers as 
well as entire agricultural subsectors. For example, the lack of credible public food safety 
standards in Bangladesh caused the poultry products market to drop by 75% for nearly a 
year after bird flu was found in Southeast Asia even though not a single case was reported 
in Bangladesh.  
Standards can impose unexpected and unremunerated costs at the local level. In Southeast 
Asian banana plantations, Dardaine (2003) notes that buyers insist that workers wear gloves 
and masks while spraying at the packing station where temperatures can reach 40°C yet will 
not increase the price paid for a box of bananas to cover such costs. Some emerging coffee 
standards piloted by some of the world’s largest coffee companies to improve sustainable 
field practices present an interesting case study. The International Coffee Organization 
(2004) noted that such standards risk becoming a barrier to entry since they impose 
requirements that producers themselves have to finance in order to participate. The 
embedded environmental and social practices may be useful and improve farm 
management, but when imposed on smaller farms without the capital or skills to affect the 
changes, they can negatively impact the very sustainability that they propose to support.  
A number of nations have guidelines and laws for the growing or importation of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), and these present a unique challenge.  Unlike a standard that 
can be met gradually or eventually, GMO contamination of non-GMO crops may be more 
permanent and is not something that producers can readily alter. The potential for genetic 
drift is causing trade problems for some producers and countries such as the US and 
Canada when after industry assurances of containment capability, a number of food crops 
and storage facilities were discovered to contain GMOs. The EU has already imposed 
systematic order inspections in August 2006 as an emergency measure after the discovery 
of illegal, genetically modified rice from the PRC.  
Standards can provide opportunities for increasing sustainable production and improving 
quality and overall competitiveness. The application of standards, however, is a difficult 
adjustment for many farmers faced with reduced extension services, inadequate information, 
and outdated capacities. The application of private grades and standards could inadvertently 
lead to the consolidation of producers, largely eliminating smallholders and the poor from the 
value chain. A number of countries are now supporting initiatives to develop largely private-
sector-based tools such as contract farming to better deal with this challenge. 
The Role of Contracts in Agricultural Trade Standards 
Contract farming is a way to enable small and medium producers to access the benefits of 
standards. Using contractual arrangements, agro-industry can assist some farm families to 
shift from traditional agriculture to production of higher-value products (Patrick, 2003). This 
may potentially increase incomes of contracting smallholders, reduce risks, and have 
multiplier effects in the rural economy.  
In the context of agriculture, Sykuta and Parcell (2002) explain that a contract codifies the 
rules of transactions through three key elements: value, risk, and decision rights. A 
successful contract allocates value, risk, and decisions in a way that is mutually beneficial, 
ideally sharing risk and improving quality and production (MMWBP, 2005). As such it can 
assign roles in meeting standards and other difficult demands of modern agrifood trading 
systems.  
Generally the buyer selects standards and transmits this condition up the value chain. Small 
producers may be unfamiliar with the requirements of standards and unable to access the 
necessary technology or equipment. Then a contractor can more readily serve as a conduit 
for providing such requirements, and producers are relieved of finding the right product or 
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technology and financing its initial purchase. Since producers rarely visit the terminal 
markets for their products, they may not be fully aware of specific requirements. In several 
southern African nations, one processing and exporting firm was able to enter a market 
dominated by European producers when it expanded its extension services to local farmers, 
using technology to help them understand and achieve the desired color range for peppers 
that were to be exported as paprika (van Gent, 2005; Giovannucci et al., 2001).  
Contract farming can also improve market access especially for smaller producers. As 
contractors work with farmers to ensure that standards are met, they also aggregate supply 
and provide the necessary packaging, transportation, and transaction requirements to 
enable sales and higher-value markets. For example, a large commercial horticultural firm in 
Zambia helps smallholder farmers sell EUREPGAP certified vegetables to Europe by 
providing them access to the firm’s own packing plant and airfreight quotas (Purcell and van 
Gent, 2005). 
A certain balance of power between participants in the value-chain is necessary to facilitate 
sound relationships, and unless farms are quite large or well organized, this requires the 
presence of viable institutional structures. Poulton et al. (2004) noted in the case of Africa 
that contracts were more successful where there was neither monopsony buyer power nor 
perfect competition among buyers (MMWBP, 2005). As an example, in Viet Nam, contract 
farming of undifferentiated products such as ordinary rice has not succeeded as it has with 
specialty products such as organic aromatic rice, because side-selling is more difficult for 
specialty products (MMWBP, 2007). 
In Viet Nam, the enactment of Decision 80 in 2002 attempted to increase the use of 
contracts to improve procurement and efficiency in the rural economy. The government has 
tried to provide incentives for parties to engage in contracts by providing favorable access to 
finance, land, and infrastructure. However, contracts under Decision 80 have largely been 
unsuccessful to date. Nguyen Do Anh Tuan et al. (2004) and Tran Cong Thang et al. (2004) 
suggest that three main issues have compromised such contracts. First, farmers have been 
accused of reneging on contracts when higher prices are offered from traders. Second, 
when buyers are faced with oversupplies of products from contracted producers, quality 
standards are sometimes tightened so processors can reject unwanted output. Third, 
knowledge of contractual obligations by parties in the contract is often lacking (MMWBP, 
2005). 
For contracts to be successfully used in many Asian countries, several areas will need to be 
improved. First, a “one size fits all” approach toward contracts may hurt, rather than help, 
producers and buyers. Second, the limited organization of producers and the imbalance in 
market relationships that are not addressed by institutions lead to failures. Third, greater 
knowledge is required in both the public and private sector to educate those engaged in 
contracts on the nature of contractual obligations and to develop enforcement mechanisms 
(formal or informal) that improve the governance of contracting relationships. Combined, 
these issues suggest both greater public sector roles and also greater strengthening and 
tightening of the value-chain through improved private-sector organization. Without such 
measures, the poor are unlikely to benefit from their participation in contracting relationships 
to raise quality and improve production practices (MMWBP, 2005).   
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Synthesis  
Standards are increasingly critical for global trade competitiveness and becoming more 
decisive at the domestic level in less developed countries. Trends indicate that even for 
domestic markets, standards will increasingly represent the rules of the game. This is 
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especially true for higher-value and perishable products including fruit, vegetables, seafood, 
dairy, and meat products. Standards, like the markets they serve, are dynamic and rapidly 
evolving. They pose very substantial challenges, especially for smaller producers. Yet, within 
the challenge of standards there are a host of opportunities. 
As Hoffman notes,20 governments should look beyond the immediate costs to the prospects 
and the catalytic role that standards offer both for national competitiveness and 
environmental sustainability. For developing countries, these standards provide competitive 
options with higher-value products, especially sustainability standards such as organics 
whose process management and traceability can aid market entry and whose application 
methods are well suited to small-farm conditions.  
The public sectors in most developing countries often lack know-how in this area, and their 
capacity to provide extension services and marketing support has further diminished in 
recent decades. A measure of public support, often with private partnerships, i.e., contract 
farming, semi-private extension, etc., is vital to ensure efficient and affordable participation 
for small and medium farmers or rural enterprises. Given the unique nature of standards, an 
innovative response will be necessary in order for government to be effective. Two issues 
are predominant:  
1. Information and capacity building to help producers, firms, and traders compete;  
2. Institutional structures to enable the majority of farmers and SMEs to invest and 
participate. 
Policy Focus 
Van Gelder et al. (2006) note that “Policies on food safety often lead to standards that 
cannot be met by southern countries” and that a program to build capacity is necessary to 
meet standards. The World Bank, formulating its rural strategy in 2003, acknowledged how 
market trends require a new focus on knowledge, value chains, and sustainability that align 
with the inevitable standards needed for higher-value crops, sustainable production systems, 
and chains. This change in emphasis reflects a similar policy focus in many of its 
progressive client countries. 
Policies 
Policies play a big role, and particularly those that influence distributional outcomes will 
contribute to competitiveness in the long run as small and medium rural entrepreneurs 
develop and advance the sector. For example, for small and medium producers to 
participate in the livestock sector requires coordinated taxation policy between producers 
and their contractors. In this sector, inputs (primarily feed) can represent three-fourths of the 
cost of production (FAO), and many nations tax market transactions between the contractors 
(feed and input suppliers) and producers who raise the animals. In contrast, most nations do 
not tax the grain transfers within integrated operations. Taxing transactions with small 
producers not only is a relatively modest source of government revenue but also creates a 
disincentive for working with such out-growers, giving larger, vertically coordinated firms a 
distinct advantage.  
It can be difficult to determine which standards to select for development training. Some 
standards are highly specific to a subsector or desired in a particular market. However, 
                                                
20 Ulrich Hoffmann, Chief, UNCTAD Trade and Sustainable Development Section, address to plenary conference 
on Trade and Environment Dimensions in the Food and Food Processing Industries in Asia and the Pacific 
(16-18 October 2006). 
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numerous basic standards are relevant across both sectors and markets and are therefore 
the most useful starting points. For example, integrating GAP practices into basic production 
methods can provide a measure of basic production sustainability and also the baseline 
requirement for many other field standards. Subsequent interventions would likely progress 
toward more sophisticated standards such as organics that can have broader local 
environmental impacts and international market relevance  
Public and Private Roles  
Public and private roles around the issue of standards are intimately intertwined and 
complementary. At some levels the public sector is intrinsically too slow to be an effective 
arbiter or facilitator of the many increasingly important private standards. The private sector 
too has its limitations, primarily the failure to adequately address the public concerns for food 
safety and value chain equity. Still, some useful distinctions exist between private and public 
sector responses to changes in technical standards.  
On the whole, the public sector in many developing countries appears unprepared to handle 
the new norms, since public formulation and enforcement of standards have been relatively 
weak or even absent. This is important since even the slow-to-change public standards, 
such as Minimum Residue Levels, are progressively more demanding. A clear concern 
exists about the possible use of public standards as a non-tariff trade barrier. Even if they 
can be met, the high compliance costs imply the possible erosion of the comparative 
production advantages in developing countries. 
Private standards are often developed at the firm level.21 The expansion and proliferation of 
these standards can generate particularly onerous transaction costs for producers and 
SMEs. Small farms typically face higher compliance costs than larger ones as they are more 
likely to lack internal control systems, technical capacity, and investment capital. Therefore, 
if they do not either participate in proactive value chains or have a measure of institutional 
support, they may essentially end up producing less-tradeable goods.  
Accordingly, dealing with standards requires new, more agile institutional frameworks than 
traditional methods. As such, innovative institutional structures can equitably link 
international capacity to local needs. A better collaboration with value chains via practical 
structures such as contract farming will help ensure competitiveness and inclusion of SMEs 
and smaller farmers. Consequently, it is imperative for government to take the lead in 
creating an enabling environment to meet three objectives:  
1. Knowledge management infrastructure to both distill information and provide 
access to it; 
2. Business development strategies that integrate with the private sector to ensure 
standards relevance; 
3. Institutional structures oriented to producers but also encompassing the entire 
chain to guarantee both equity and long-term competitiveness. 
 
The recent ubiquitousness of standards and new value-chain models present a unique 
opportunity to learn and develop appropriate interventions that spur the competitiveness of 
inputs, production, processing, and marketing. 
                                                
21 Trade associations also create standards in their role as proxies for private firms. 
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1. Knowledge management  
Knowledge management systems are vital to aid awareness and understanding of the 
drivers, threats, and opportunities implicit in the relevant and forthcoming standards. This 
includes dedicated, locally accessible knowledge platforms so that producers, SMEs, and 
value chains can better understand emerging market trends in different areas, differences 
between standards, and implications of adopting particular ones. For example, the work of 
the Sustainable Commodity Initiative's Committee on Sustainability Assessments (COSA) 
provides institutions with a detailed grasp of producers’ full costs and benefits involved in 
adopting diverse sustainability standards and initiatives. 
Although standards are dynamic and changing, their basic premises are consistent and can 
be conveyed in a variety of teaching forms, which range from farmer field schools to 
influencing the curricula of Technical and Vocational Training schools in order to enhance 
the skills of farmers and extension agents. 
Although education can provide the basis of learning, producers and traders also need 
knowledge management systems that can provide progressive and more dynamic market 
intelligence. Market intelligence requires services that can assess the nature of demand, 
standards requirements, trends, and projections in the relevant markets. Rather than setting 
up new market information systems, it would be more productive to link with existing private 
sources of information that are increasingly available and also with ongoing public initiatives 
such as those developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and by 
the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT by its Spanish acronym).  
2. Business strategies 
It can be particularly productive for government to partner with the private sector in order to 
develop strategic medium- and long-term public responses that effectively support 
competitive value chains. The trade participation of most producers and SMEs will occur 
through value chains. These are characterized by systemic rather than individual 
efficiencies, and value chains both generate and distribute rents, though not necessarily 
equally. Without accessible knowledge systems and supporting institutions, smaller and 
weaker chain members are more likely to be eliminated than strengthened. 
Public-private partnership can help smallholder producers to more effectively participate in 
value chains; yet, an important lesson on the public side is for government to adequately 
address the potential exclusionary impacts of standards development. 
3. Institutional structures 
While national-level reach is important, locally relevant institutional structures are vital in 
order to both create immediate local capacity and establish the institutional trajectories 
necessary to foster long-term agricultural competitiveness as well as include a broader 
portion of rural producers and SMEs. 
These institutional structures and supporting policies include NGOs, educational centers, 
producer organizations, trade associations, and local government agencies such as 
extension services. They also are market information systems, certification systems, 
regulatory mechanisms to make clear the rules of the game, and enforcement 
mechanisms—both public and private—to monitor and ensure compliance. These hardware 
and software aspects work best when there is transparency and interrelatedness in the 
systems. Such institutions provide consistency at the local level as well as market-oriented 
linkages to international technology and information. Without these frameworks, smaller 
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producers and SMEs will find it difficult to adapt and to improve their capacity and to 
equitably participate in value chains and markets.  
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